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NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR WORKER REPRESENTATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: THEORETICAL ISSUES
BY ALAN HYDE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Labor union membership continues to decline in the United
States, especially in the private sector.1  Meanwhile, in the last dec-
ade or so, several new organizations that advocate for working peo-
ple have emerged. I will discuss many of these groups, using the
term Alternative Worker Organization (AWO) to refer to all of
them.  The common feature that sets AWOs apart from traditional
labor unions is that they function more like social movements than
traditional unions.  Although influential, no one type of AWO is
numerically large or dominant, even in a particular industry or
firm.  The safest short-term prediction is that, over the next decade
at least, United States labor law will have to accommodate a wide
variety of different emerging institutions and movements of worker
representation.
This article proposes that all of these organizations contribute
something important to the labor and organizing movements, and
that these contributions will need to be considered by policymak-
ers.  The same will be true of even newer organizations that have yet
to emerge.  However, my tentative conclusion is that AWOs will not
become dominant in any particular industry or location because
they face two particularly large obstacles.  First, AWOs have yet to
appeal to a really substantial number of working people whose pre-
existing attitudes dispose them against union membership.2  Sec-
ond, the alliances necessary for survival of AWOs include groups
with sharply varying agendas that often put little importance on the
* Professor and Sidney Reitman Scholar, Rutgers University School of Law,
Newark.
1. Unions represent 12.5% of the overall U.S. workforce and only 7.9% of the
private sector.  The private sector rate is half the rate that it was in 1983, when the
current data series began. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members Sum-
mary (Jan. 27, 2005), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
2. See Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism
as a Cause for Labor’s Decline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133 (1998).
385
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construction of enduring organization.3  On the other hand, I will
show that some defects that others have identified are exaggerated.
AWOs do not appear to face any unique problems in collective ac-
tion, or projecting power.  Part II of this article reviews some recent
AWOs in the United States.  Part III briefly discusses the legal
framework for their regulation.  Part IV discusses theoretical issues
relating to unique challenges of the AWOs.  Do AWOs face collec-
tive action problems distinct from those faced by traditional un-
ions?  Do AWOs have unique difficulties in projecting power and
attaining results?  Will the alliances necessary to the growth of
AWOs impede their effectiveness for employees?
Based on the achievements of AWOs to date, there does not
appear to be any compelling policy reason for the law to channel
workers into one type of organization rather than another, or pro-
vide incentives such as a representational monopoly to particular
types or forms of organizations — as opposed to any organization
that enrolls a majority.  The guiding legal principles should be tol-
erance of organizational diversity and pluralism, and the mainte-
nance of basic values of democracy and organizational
responsiveness.
II. THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL LANDSCAPE
IN THE UNITED STATES
It is difficult to present a coherent picture of emerging nonun-
ion institutions of worker advocacy since many forms compete;
there are no legal definitions of any, and no scholarly consensus
about how to define or classify them.  This article will deal with
eight types of AWOs; however, this list should not be considered
complete because the groups will change over time. The list and
classifications will be revised many times, both by myself and by
others.  I include organizations that actually exist (as opposed to
the theoretical); that articulate and organize concerns of workers
(all terms have been defined broadly and non-technically); and do
3. See Alan Hyde, Who Speaks for the Working Poor?: A Preliminary Look at the Emerg-
ing Tetralogy of Representation of Low-Wage Service Workers, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
599 (2004).
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not themselves attempt to earn a profit.4  I follow Richard Freeman
and Joni Hersch in distinguishing “membership” from “nonmem-
bership” organizations.5  To this pair, I add spontaneous or incho-
ate protests that do not seem to fall well into either “membership”
or “nonmembership” organizations.  The eight types of AWOs
worth discussing under this definition are:
Membership Organizations:
1. Membership organizations affiliated with labor unions,
such as, Working America,6 Washington Alliance of Tech-
nical Workers (WashTech/CWA),7 Alliance@IBM, Restau-
rant Opportunities Center, and Working Partnerships.
2. Employee caucuses, which are membership groups typi-
cally sponsored by employers.
3. Working Today.8
4. Some for-profit temporary help agencies not only help find work for individ-
ual clients, but also advocate for their individual clients on the job, provide job counsel-
ing, assist with resume writing and interview skills, and train.  In Silicon Valley,
temporary help agencies have successfully urged corporate customers to raise salaries to
prevailing levels, and assisted in the removal of managers whose harsh attitudes were
affecting recruiting.  ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 147-50 (2003); Esther B. Neuwirth,
“Silicon Valley Temps”: An Ethnographic Account of the Staffing Industry (2002),
http://www.iir.ucla.edu/research/grad_conf/2002/neuwirth.pdf.  It does not strain
credulity to describe such temporary help agencies as a kind of AWO, albeit one run for
profit.  If the temporary help agency is considered a worker organization, it may be the
most successful new model in the United States economy.  While only 2.2 million work-
ers worked for temporary help agencies in 2002, the sector is projected to grow rapidly
over the next decade, see U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employment Services, www.bls.gov/oco/
cg/cgs039.htm (last modified Feb. 27, 2005).  This paper will not provide a detailed
discussion of proprietary temporary help agencies.  However, their existence represents
the major competition for some of the organizations that will be discussed, such as the
benefits provider Working Today, and the unsuccessful temporary help agency run for
a time by the Working Partnerships project of the South Bay Labor Council in San Jose,
California.
5. EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2
(Richard B. Freeman, Joni Hersch & Lawrence Mishel eds., 2005) [hereinafter
EMERGING].
6. See Lauren Snyder, Organization Profile, Working America, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 589 (2005-2006).
7. See Danielle D. van Jaarsveld, Insights from the Temporary Agency Workforce: Over-
coming Obstacles to Worker Representation, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 355 (2005-2006).
8. See Sarah N. Kelly & Christine Tramontano, Organization Profile, Working To-
day, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 597 (2005-2006).
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Nonmembership Organizations:
4. Immigrants’ advocacy organizations, such as Casa Mexico,
Domestic Workers United, and Immigrants Support
Network.9
5. Immigrants’ centers, such as the Workplace Project.10
6. Legal advocacy groups, such as National Employment Law
Project,11 Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education
Fund, and New York University School of Law Immigrants’
Rights Clinic.
7. Governmental agencies that advocate for workers, such as
New York State Attorney General and New York City
Council.
Spontaneous Protests with Limited Formal Organization:
8. Intranet and Internet-based protests, such as the pension
rights protest at AT&T and IBM, and the bonus policy pro-
test at Apple Computer.
None of the definitions are rigorous and all distinctions among
them are somewhat factitious.  Real-world advocacy campaigns
often involve joint action among groups from several categories.12
While Part II is descriptive, it will be clear that, in general, AWOs
are surprisingly effective at motivating group action and achieving
results often beyond the reach of traditional unions.  However, they
have difficulty sustaining organization, and have complicated rela-
tions with allies — specifically, legal and governmental actors and
traditional unions.  Part III briefly discusses their legal status in
United States labor law.  Part IV discusses theoretical issues relating
to their stability and effectiveness.
9. See Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing: Creative Campaign Strategies of
the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465 (2005-2006); Rosanna M.
Kreychman & Heather H. Volik, Organization Profile, Immigrant Workers Project of the
AFL-CIO, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 561 (2005-2006).
10. EMERGING, supra note 5. See Emily Stein, Organization Profile, The Workplace
Project, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 607 (2005-2006).
11. See Joshua N. Leonardi, Organization Profile, The National Employment Law Pro-
ject, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 579 (2005-2006).
12. See Hyde, supra note 3 (describing campaigns involving unions, immigrant ad- R
vocacy groups, legal advocacy groups and governmental representatives, either in coop-
eration or competition).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-2\NLR205.txt unknown Seq: 5 14-APR-06 7:58
2005-2006] NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR WORKER REPRESENTATION 389
A. Membership Organizations
1. Membership Organizations Affiliated with Labor
Unions
United States labor union practice extends union membership
only to those actively working at worksites where unions represent
them, and perhaps also to retired employees.13  Unions tradition-
ally did little to stay in touch with members who left union work, or
moved to other regions of the country with lower union density;
membership was tied to the specific employment.14
Unions have recently developed several affiliated organizations
that directly enroll members but do not bargain for them collec-
tively or otherwise deal with employers on their behalf.  These have
been organized by the national federation itself (AFL-CIO); inter-
national unions (Communication Workers); a central labor council
(Working Partnerships); and a local union (Hotel and Restaurant
Workers in New York City).  All attempted to create different types
of movements that will remain affiliated with the sponsoring labor
union.
The AFL-CIO has created Working America, “A Community
Affiliate of the AFL-CIO.”15  Working America is a membership or-
ganization of individuals who affiliate with the labor movement but
are not members of any particular union or represented by one for
purposes of collective bargaining.  Until now, Working America has
only been used as a get-out-the-vote vehicle.  Early efforts focused
on residents of working-class neighborhoods in states anticipated to
be in play during the 2004 presidential election, that is, Ohio, Mis-
souri, and Florida.  Door-to-door organizers signed up members
who agreed to be mobilized, often by e-mail.  Early efforts have
been successful at registering members and mobilizing them to vote
for the Democratic Party.  Working America has not yet tried to
mobilize its members for other projects.  It does not arrange face-
to-face meetings among its members.  Working America is directed
13. Howard Wial, The Emerging Organizational Structure of Unionism in Low Wage Ser-
vices, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 671 (1993). See also Casey Ichniowski & Jeffrey S. Zax, Today’s
Associations, Tomorrow’s Unions, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 191, 192 (1990).
14. Wial, supra note 13, at 678-79, 698, 699 n.90. R
15. See Snyder, supra note 6, at 590. R
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by the central AFL-CIO; it is not controlled by its members and
does not function as a democratic organization.16
The Communication Workers of America (CWA) is an estab-
lished union that represents workers at traditional telephone com-
panies. CWA has set up two innovative projects to advance the
interests of information professionals without representing them
for purposes of collective bargaining.  These have been described
as “virtual unions.”17  The first is WashTech, which focuses on indi-
viduals working at Microsoft Corp. who are classified either as
independent contractors or employees of temporary help agencies
and thus are excluded, under Microsoft’s internal practices, from
most Microsoft benefit plans.18  WashTech has lobbied in Washing-
16. Robert Fox, Address at the New York  Law School Next Wave Organizing Sym-
posium (Jan. 28, 2005).
17. Wayne J. Diamond & Richard B. Freeman, Will Unionism Prosper in Cyber-Space?:
The Promise of the Internet for Employee Organization (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8483, 2001).
18. There is no formal legal relationship in the United States between employee
status and participation in employer benefits plans.  This point is frequently misunder-
stood.  On the one hand, employers are certainly privileged to include independent
contractors, and employees referred by temporary help agencies, in benefits plans.
Similarly, status as a statutory “employee” does not automatically carry the right to par-
ticipate in employer programs.  Employers are normally privileged to create different
classes of employees with different access to benefits programs.  This point is demon-
strated in the well-known, but generally misunderstood, litigation against Microsoft it-
self.  The Internal Revenue Service determined that certain individuals working at
Microsoft were statutory employees, for whom taxes should have been withheld.
Microsoft did not challenge this reclassification.  The employees then sued Microsoft,
claiming that, as employees, they had a right to participate in numerous Microsoft ben-
efit programs, such as health insurance, pensions, bonuses, and the self-directed invest-
ment plans known as 401(k) plans.  It is rarely appreciated that they lost on every one of
these claims except for one: as employees, they were entitled to participate in a very
unusual stock purchase plan that by federal law must be open to all employees. See
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing to order inclusion
in 401(k) plan but ordering inclusion in employee stock purchase plan organized
under Internal Revenue Code § 423).  Such plans were rarely used even before the
Vizcaino decision and are unlikely to be encountered again.  WashTech did not re-
present the plaintiff class in the Vizcaino litigation but thereafter took an active role in
advising workers of their rights.  Programs covered by the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA), including programs for retirement income and health in-
surance, are subject to its nondiscrimination rules, but these rules do not require equal
treatment of employees.  They are designed rather primarily to prevent sham benefits
plans that benefit only top managers, and are shot full of exceptions. See generally Jo-
seph Bankman, The Effect of Anti-Discrimination Provisions on Rank-and-File Compensation,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 597 (1994).
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ton State for changes in employment laws and offers classes in job
training skills, such as computer programming.  It has requested
bargaining recognition from at least four temporary help agencies
but had been unsuccessful before winning a card check at Cingular
in Bothell, WA in November 2005.19  Like other organizations dis-
cussed in this article, it has many more individuals visiting its web
page, and joining for specific action, than dues-paying members.
In fact, there were only 460 members as of early 2005.20  Alli-
ance@IBM, another CWA affiliate, organizes among older IBM em-
ployees concerned about downsizing and retirement issues.  It
maintains a web site with information about pension rights and liti-
gation involving IBM employees.21
The South Bay Labor Council, in San Jose, California, the met-
ropolitan center of Silicon Valley, supports an innovative project
that attempts to organize low-wage workers, particularly temporary
and contingent workers.  The South Bay Labor Council speaks for
the workers but does not represent them in collective bargaining.
Working Partnerships USA, the project, has done community or-
ganizing, lobbied for living wage legislation, public housing, and
health insurance, and issued research reports.22  Perhaps its most
innovative project, a union-run temporary help agency, did not suc-
19. Jeff Nachtigal, Cingular Organizing Drive a Success!, WASHTECH NEWS
(WashTech/CWA, Seattle, Wash.), Nov. 18, 2005, http://www.washtech.org/news/la-
bor/display.php?ID_Content=5023 (“The American Arbitration Association certified by
card check Nov. 4 that a majority of the workers wanted CWA union recognition. They
will be represented by WashTech/CWA Local 37083 in Seattle.”). See also HYDE, supra
note 4, at 178-79; Virginia L. DuRivage, CWA’s Organizing Strategies: Transforming Contract R
Jobs into Union Jobs, in NONSTANDARD WORK: THE NATURE AND CHALLENGES OF CHANGING
EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS 377 (Franc¸oise Carre´ et al. eds., 2000); Steven Green-
house, Five Questions for Larry Cohen: Renewing a Union in the New Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2000, at 4; Harry C. Katz, Rosemary Batt & Jeffrey H. Keefe, The Revitalization of
the CWA: Integrating Collective Bargaining, Political Action, and Organizing, 56 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 573 (2003).
20. Various Issues Faced in Union Organizing Are Examined at AFL-CIO Conference, 176
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 15, D-23 (Mar. 21, 2005) (citing Morton Bahr, President, Com-
munications Workers of America, who estimates that WashTech has 17,000 e-mail sub-
scribers and 460 dues-paying members).
21. HYDE, supra note 4, at 178-79.  It is not difficult to foresee potential conflict R
between the young freelancers organized by WashTech and the older IBM employees
organized by Alliance@IBM.
22. Barbara Byrd & Nar Rhee, Building Power in the New Economy: The South
Bay Labor Council, http://www.laborstudies.wayne.edu/power/downloads/
San_Jose.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
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ceed.23  Working Partnerships USA, a temporary help agency was
designed to provide high-quality competition to the region’s for-
profit temporary help agencies, by emphasizing skills training and
career development.24  When I interviewed its president in October
2001 it was placing only forty or fifty individuals each week.25
In some ways the most interesting AWO attempts self-con-
sciously to form a movement for workers who are unquestionably
defined as employees and could be represented through traditional
union representation.  Restaurant Opportunities Center New York
(ROC-NY), was asked by Local 100, Hotel and Restaurant Employ-
ees (HERE), to start an independent organization to work with dis-
placed workers after the destruction of the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001.  ROC-NY was asked to coordinate social ser-
vices for the surviving staff of the Windows on the World restau-
rant.26  With charitable donations coming in, the union found it
convenient for accounting and disclosure purposes to create a sepa-
rate entity, organized, not as a labor organization, but as a charity.
Such a nonunion structure soon proved potentially useful as an or-
ganizing vehicle, particularly after the hiring of executive director
Saru Jayaraman, who formerly worked at the Workplace Project.27
ROC-NY has now engaged in six successful organizing cam-
paigns at groups of fancy “white tablecloth” restaurants in New York
City.  These campaigns have culminated in the signing of a con-
23. A telephone call on September 14, 2005 to Working Partnership staff con-
firmed that the program stopped running on December 31, 2003. See also Working
Partnership USA, Projects, http://www.wpusa.org/projects/index.pl (last visited Nov.
28, 2005).
24. SUNDARI BARU, WORKING ON THE MARGINS: CALIFORNIA’S GROWING TEMPORARY
WORKFORCE 31 (2001), available at http://www.onlinecpi.org/pdf/CPI-TempWorkers.
pdf  (stating that Silicon Valley employs employees of temporary help agencies at twice
the national rate: about 3.53% of jobs in the Valley are with temporary help agencies).
25. HYDE, supra note 4, at 175-76. R
26. An estimated 165,000 people work in New York City restaurants, of whom only
5% or so are members of the relevant locals of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees
(HERE). See BEHIND THE KITCHEN DOOR: PERVASIVE INEQUALITY IN NEW YORK CITY’S
THRIVING RESTAURANT INDUSTRY (Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York & New
York City Industry Coalition 2005), http://www.rocny.org/documents/RocNY_final_
compiled.pdf.
27. See Kavita Kulkarni, Fighting for Justice: Organizing for Immigrant Workers’
Rights, An Interview With Saru Jayaraman (Feb. 27, 2004), http://www.nyu.edu/galla-
tin/communitylearning/writings; infra text accompanying notes 47-48 (discussing the
Workplace Project).
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tract, enforceable not as a collective bargaining agreement — since
ROC-NY claims not to be a statutory “labor organization” — but as
a contract under state law.  The employers commit to increases in
wages and benefits, settle claims of discrimination and failure to pay
minimum wage or overtime, and pledge job security, including a
pledge not to discharge employees without notice to ROC-NY.28
These agreements have been signed following lengthy campaigns
marked by public demonstrations, “dinner theater” performances
by students who gain admission to the restaurant as patrons, and
similar media events.29
I asked Saru Jayaraman why, in light of this success, it was im-
portant for ROC-NY that it not be a “labor organization,” since
these employers might well have recognized HERE as an exclusive
representative.  She mentioned three legal advantages that ROC-NY
believes it gains from being a charity rather than a labor organiza-
tion.  First, ROC-NY does not service contracts.  It does not expend
resources on arbitrating grievances or owe a duty of fair representa-
tion.  Second, the charity does not face the same limitations and
restrictions that unions may face.30  Third, ROC-NY opened the
worker-owned restaurant COLORS in Greenwich Village in January
2006.  Although unions have helped organize employee trusts to
own companies, the legal picture is not entirely clear, and
Jayaraman thinks that it is possible that an organization that is not a
labor organization might have more freedom to own a business or
facilitate such employee ownership.31  A possible drawback that
28. Steven Greenhouse, Two Restaurants to Pay Workers $164,000, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
12, 2005, at B3.  A crucial moment in the growth of any AWO is its first appearance in
an article by Steven Greenhouse in the New York Times. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse,
Gristede’s Deliverymen to Share in $3.2 Million Wage Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at
B2; Steven Greenhouse, Korean Grocers Agree to Double Pay and Improve Workplace Condi-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at B1. See Hyde, supra note 3. R
29. Saru Jayaraman, Seminar Presentation at the Rutgers University School of Law
(Apr. 5, 2005).
30. E.g., National Labor Relations Act §8(b)(7)(C), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(7)(C)
(2000) (restricting organizational picketing).
31. Interview with Saru Jayaraman, Executive Director, Restaurant Opportunities
Center of N.Y., in Newark, N.J. (Apr. 5, 2005). I am reporting what Saru Jayaraman told
me about why ROC-NY has attempted to be a charity, rather than a labor organization.
I do not entirely agree with her analysis.  There is no legal impediment to union in-
volvement in employee ownership. See generally Alan Hyde & Craig Harnett Livingston,
Employee Takeovers, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1131 (1987) (discussing union-led takeovers in
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might offset the positive aspects of ROC-NY not being a labor or-
ganization might be that unions have greater freedom of political
action under federal law than do charities.32  ROC-NY also litigates
claims for restaurant workers under employment statutes, lobbies
and advocates for restaurant workers, and provides classes on immi-
gration rights and other subjects.
2. Employee Caucuses
Many large United States employers, otherwise nonunion, per-
mit or even encourage caucuses in which African-American, La-
tino/a, Asian, female, or gay and lesbian employees meet to discuss
common interests, assist the employer in recruiting or community
efforts, and otherwise provide mutual support.33  Such groups are
known only when individual employers permit research about
them.  There is no data on how widespread they are and no formal
definition of them.34  These employee groups apparently restrict
the 1980s).  I am also not as confident as she is that ROC-NY has achieved its goal of
avoiding “labor organization” status. See infra text accompanying notes 85-89.  Failure
of a labor organization to file necessary reports is punishable with fines or a year in
prison, Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) § 209, 29 U.S.C.
§ 439 (2000).
32. E-mail from Saru Jayaraman, Executive Director, ROC-NY, to Alan Hyde, Pro-
fessor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law (Apr. 6, 2005) (on file with author).
33. HYDE, supra note 4, at 170-73; RAYMOND A. FRIEDMAN & DONNA CARTER, AFRI- R
CAN AMERICAN NETWORK GROUPS: THEIR IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS, AN EXECUTIVE LEAD-
ERSHIP COUNCIL STUDY (1993); Raymond A. Friedman, Defining the Scope and Logic of
Minority and Female Network Groups: Can Separation Enhance Integration?, 14 REV. PERSON-
NEL & HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 307 (1996).
34. Indeed, there is no common name.  Raymond Friedman, the leading scholar
of such groups, prefers “minority employee network group.” See, e.g., Raymond A.
Friedman & Kellina M. Craig, Predicting Joining and Participating in Minority Employee Net-
work Groups, 44 INDUS. REL. 793 (2004).  I normally reserve “network” for groups that
transcend the boundaries of individual firms, in order to refer to the emerging eco-
nomic literature revolving around the contrast between firms and networks. See, e.g.,
HARRISON C. WHITE, MARKETS FROM NETWORKS: SOCIOECONOMIC MODELS OF PRODUC-
TION (2002); Kenneth Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, 12 J.
ECON. PERSP. 91, 98 (1998).  I normally refer to “identity caucuses,” which I believe to
be the more commonly used term. See Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in
the Emerging System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149 (1993), reprinted in THE
LEGAL FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION (Matthew W. Finkin ed., 1994).  However,
“caucus” potentially creates confusion with identity-based caucuses that function within
labor unions.  See the outstanding article by Ruben J. Garcia, New Voices at Work: Race
and Gender Identity Caucuses in the U.S. Labor Movement, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 79 (2002).  I will
not be discussing intra-union caucuses in this article.
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themselves to mutual support and assisting management.  They
rarely make any formal demands on management.35  Indeed, an in-
dividual’s participation in them is correlated with perceived gains
from participation and a sense of group identity, but not with oppo-
sition to or dissatisfaction with the employer.36  The extent to which
group identity can overcome collective action problems for AWOs
will be an important issue for AWOs throughout this paper and in
future study.  In general, as we shall see, group identity is crucial in
overcoming collective action problems.
3. Benefits Provider: Working Today
Working Today,37 based in New York City, is a membership or-
ganization not affiliated with any union.  It aspires to become a
movement or lobbying organization speaking for everyone who
works.  Its particular focus is on independent contractors, freelanc-
ers, frequent job-changers, part-time workers, and others who fall
outside the model of work often assumed by employment law and
labor unions.  Its current strategy of organization, typical of worker
organizations of the past two centuries, is to sell health insurance
and other portable benefits as a way of building membership.
When reviewed by Joni Hersch in 2003, the package appeared fairly
expensive, offering little advantage over plans available directly
from insurance companies.38  “It remains to be seen whether a par-
ticipatory or democratic employee organization will have any advan-
tage over the private sector in the marketing of benefits such as
health insurance.  I cannot think of any practical or theoretical rea-
son why it should.”39
35. The exception is that gay and lesbian caucuses normally request domestic
partner benefits, but normally make no other formal demands on management. See
Maureen Scully, Managing the Legitimacy of Controversial Issues: The Role of Gay Employee
Groups in the Adoption of Domestic Partner Benefits (1997) (unpublished paper presented at
the Industrial Relations Research Association Spring Meeting, New York, NY).
36. Friedman & Craig, supra note 34, at 798, 807, 808. R
37. See Kelly & Tramontano, supra note 8; Working Today, About Us, http://
www.workingtoday.org/about/index.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
38. See Joni Hersch, A Workers’ Lobby to Provide Portable Benefits, in EMERGING, supra
note 5, at 225-26. See Working Today, Freelancers Union Benefits, http://www.working R
today.org/productsservices/products.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2005) (now listing more
reasonable plans on the organization’s web site).
39. HYDE, supra note 4, at 179. R
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4. Immigrants’ Rights Organizations
Some organizations that provide services and advocacy for im-
migrant workers also speak for them on issues at work.  Casa Mex-
ico played a supporting role in attempts to organize employees of
greengrocers in New York State, nearly all of whom are Mexican
immigrants.40  Its spokesperson, Jerry Dominguez, is normally iden-
tified as speaking also for Asociacio´n Mexicano-Americano de
Trabajadores (AMAT),41 an organization that stages “reactive pro-
tests” but does not formally represent workers in collective bargain-
ing.42  The Immigrants Support Network (ISN) lobbies to protect
the interest of workers in the United States under the H-1B visa
program, which issues three-year visas for skilled professionals.43
Since advocacy organizations of this type are not statutory labor or-
ganizations, they may and do (as in the case of ISN) receive support
from employers.  It is funded largely by successful Indian entrepre-
neurs, such as Kanwal Rekhi (formerly of Cybermedia and Novell),
who derive no direct benefit from its success, but are largely moti-
vated by pride in the achievements of their compatriots.44
40. Casa Mexico was one of two worker representatives that signed a landmark
agreement in 2002 in which greengrocers pledged to comply with applicable employ-
ment laws and received immunity from suits to recover past wages.  The other worker
representative was the state AFL-CIO.  Neither worker representative had been desig-
nated by workers. See GREENGROCER CODE OF CONDUCT, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
workplace/final_ggcode_english_long.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2006).  For contrasting
views on the Greengrocer Code of Conduct, compare Matthew T. Bodie, The Potential
for State Labor Law: The New York Greengrocer Code of Conduct, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
183 (2003) (cautiously hopeful) with Hyde, supra note 3, at 603-06 (critical).  It has not R
proven difficult for journalists to find Mexican immigrants since the date of the agree-
ment who work in a greengrocery for seventy-two hours, for which they are paid $200,
both violations of law. See Andrew Kennis, Not All Greengrocer Workers Reap Fruits of Vic-
tory, THE VILLAGER, April 7-13, 2004, at 12; Steven Greenhouse & Seth Kugel, Labor
Truce Wearing Thin for Koreans and Mexicans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at B3; infra Part
II.B.7 “Government Bodies.”
41. See Press Release, New York State Attorney General, Laundry to Reinstate
Workers Illegally Fired for Cooperating with Investigation of Labor Exploitation (July
21, 2003), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/jul/jul21a_03.html.
42. Victoria Malkin, The New York Greengrocer Campaign: Immigrant Organizing in
Ethnic Niches, in SHARING INTEGRATION EXPERIENCES: INNOVATIVE COMMUNITY PRACTICES
44 (Aristide R. Zolberg & Alison Joy Clarkin eds., 2003), available at http://www.new
school.edu/icmec/SharingIntExp.pdf.
43. The modal holder of an H-1B visa is a computer programmer from India,
according to the sole survey taken, in 2000. See HYDE, supra note 4, at 125-39, 176-78. R
44. HYDE, supra note 4, at 125-39, 176-78. R
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5. Immigrant Worker Centers45
Another immigrants’ advocacy organization deserves separate
treatment because of the more intense level of participation it gen-
erates.  At least 133 immigrant worker centers provide advocacy and
social services targeted to workers of particular ethnic groups, in
specific geographic communities.  Examples just from Los Angeles
include Korean Immigrant Workers Advocates (KIWA), Instituto de
Educacion Popular del Sur de California (IDEPSCA), and Coalition
for Human Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA).46  An-
other well-known center is the Workplace Project, aimed at Latin
American immigrant workers on Long Island, New York, and dis-
cussed in a recent book by its founder.47  While such centers draw
on many historical antecedents in the long history of American as-
similation of immigrants, a modern prototype is said to be the
Lower East Side Worker Center, later Latino Worker Center,
founded in New York City in 1993 by the Chinese Staff and Workers
Association to assist Latino workers on formerly all-Chinese restau-
rant staffs.48  While such centers vary, nearly all introduce members
to social services; research and report on working conditions; lobby
for legal changes; advocate with government agencies; build organi-
zations, often in coalition with other groups; and offer classes inte-
grated with organizing.  Some provide legal services and sue
employers.  All occasionally advocate with employers on behalf of
individual workers.49
B. Nonmembership Organizations
As mentioned above, Freeman and Hersch distinguish “mem-
bership organizations” (such as Working America, the AFL-CIO
45. See Janice Fine, Work Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, 50
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 417 (2005-2006); Narro, supra note 9.
46. See Fine, supra note 45. See JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS ORGANIZING COMMU-
NITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006).
47. See JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS (2005). See generally Fine, supra note 45; Narro, supra note 9.
48. See GORDON, supra note 47, at 81.
49. Fine, supra note 45.  Such “dealing with employers” over grievances would pre-
sumably make most Worker Centers statutory “labor organizations” for purposes of sec-
tion 2 of the NLRA, subsection 5.  NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (defining “labor
organization”).  The issue does not appear to have been litigated.  Legal issues will be
further discussed in this article. See infra Part III.
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membership affiliate) from “nonmember-based organizations.”50
For them, the key to “nonmember-based organizations” is that “the
agents or activists select groups of workers as their principals — a
reversal of the relation in the standard principal-agent model in
which the principals select the agents.”51
Although this distinction is helpful it is not entirely clear where
the line is to be drawn when analyzing AWOs.  The organizations
discussed so far might easily be placed on either or both sides of the
line.  All enroll members and therefore are “membership organiza-
tions.”  Yet all are organized primarily by activists who selected a
group of workers as their principals (nonmembership organiza-
tions).  The projects founded by labor unions, caucuses, Working
Today, and immigrant support groups were all founded by activists
who selected a group of employees for organization, but then en-
rolled a subset of them as members. In some cases, the activists di-
rect the AWO with little direct control by the nominal members.
None of these organizations are really spontaneous or organized by
the workers themselves.  Working America, the AFL-CIO affiliate,
and Working Today, the benefits provider, are not even organized
democratically.  They hold no elections or meetings.
However, recent advocacy campaigns for low-wage, mainly im-
migrant service workers in the United States normally involve par-
ticipation and advocacy by two groups that do not even purport to
enroll workers as members: legal advocacy groups and units of the
government.
6. Legal Advocacy Groups
Numerous legal advocacy groups provide representation on is-
sues of employment law.52  Particularly prominent in recent or-
ganizing campaigns in New York are the National Employment Law
50. EMERGING, supra note 5, at 3. R
51. Id.
52. See Christine Jolls, The Role and Functioning of Public-Interest Legal Organizations
in the Enforcement of the Employment Laws, in EMERGING, supra note 5, at 141-76.  As the R
title indicates, Jolls is primarily focused on the role of Public-Interest Legal Organiza-
tions in ensuring enforcement of existing laws, rather than the broader issues of social
change or worker organization.
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Project (NELP),53 civil rights advocacy groups such as Puerto Rican
Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF), and the Immigrant
Rights Clinic of the New York University School of Law.
NELP was founded to provide research and strategic support
to local offices providing free legal assistance to poor people.54
However, it also selects litigation on its own.  For example, NELP
provided legal representation to delivery personnel for New York
City supermarkets and drug stores who were paid less than the legal
minimum wage because they were wrongfully classified as self-em-
ployed independent contractors. The employers tried to justify this
classification because the workers had been referred to them
through a contracting agency.55  While NELP does not usually con-
duct class action litigation — preferring instead to work with orga-
nizations and local legal services offices — it felt something had to
be done for the delivery personnel, who had been rebuffed by the
union representative of supermarket workers.  The litigation ended
with a finding that the delivery workers were employees, not
independent contractors, jointly employed by the stores and the
contractor, both of which were now liable for substantial back
pay.56
The PRLDEF has taken the lead in representing day laborers
seeking the right to solicit work in Freehold, New Jersey.57  This
might appear to be a surprising role for PRLDEF, since Puerto Ri-
cans are Americans and do not have immigration law problems.
53. See NELP, About Us, http://www.nelp.org/about/index.cfm (last visited Dec.
2, 2005). See also Leonardi, supra note 11.
54. See NELP, About Us, http://www.nelp.org/about/index.cfm (last visited Dec.
2, 2005).
55. Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 255 F. Supp.2d 184 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). See also Leonardi, supra  note 11 (discussing NELP’s role in the Gristede’s litiga-
tion). See Hyde, supra note 3, at 607-09. R
56. Catherine Ruckelshaus, NELP, Seminar presentation at Rutgers University
School of Law (Mar. 9, 2004).  Representatives of that union, Local 338, Retail, Whole-
sale and Department Store Workers Union (RWDSU/UFCW), reportedly told the deliv-
ery workers, accurately, that it had not conducted an organizing campaign in over thirty
years.  As a result of the Ansoumana litigation, the delivery workers are now represented
by Local 338, which negotiated an agreement giving them the legal minimum. See 255
F. Supp.2d at 187-88.
57. There have been many attempts by suburban communities to restrict massing
by day laborers, and litigation challenging these attempts; a review is beyond the scope
of this article.
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Presumably PRLDEF’s advocacy for immigrant day laborers partly
reflects PLRDEF’s strategy, announced on its web site, of “Promot-
ing Justice for Latinos,” and thus its political agenda internal to the
Latino community.58  Working “off the books,” and being paid in
cash for yard or construction work, is relatively rare in the United
States, at least compared to the rest of the world.59  In the United
States, the employment contract is so flexible that there is little sys-
tematic advantage to the employer in avoiding formal employment.
Such day labor is therefore normally assumed to be restricted to
undocumented immigrants or underage workers working outside
the labor regulations, though accurate data on “working off the
books” or day laborers are by definition not available.  The day la-
borers PRLDEF represents are mostly Latino, and so the work fits
the larger goal of advocating for the community.
NYU’s Immigrant Rights Clinic (NYU Clinic) is supervised by
three professors, one of whom, Michael Wishnie, devotes essentially
all his time to labor and employment issues particularly affecting
low-wage immigrants.60  The NYU Clinic has litigated to recover
wages for individual workers and has also assisted groups like Do-
mestic Workers United and Chinese Staff and Workers’ Association
in drafting employment legislation.61
58. Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, http://www.prldef.org (last
visited Feb. 17, 2006).  This web site is the best source of information in the long Free-
hold day laborer litigation, recent developments in which have not been officially re-
ported, see Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, About Us, PRLDEF —
Our History, http://www.prldef.org/About/abouthousing.htm (last visited Dec. 2,
2005).
59. By most measures, the United States is at low the end of countries in the size
of its unreported economy, but there are some indications that the United States un-
derground economy is growing. See generally Friedrich Schneider & Dominik H. Enste,
Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 77, 102 (2000)
(comparing the United States shadow economy to those of other countries).
60. See New York University Faculty Profiles, Michael Wishnie, http://
its.law.nyu.edu/faculty/profiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=cv.main&personID=20386 (last
visited Jan. 25, 2005).
61. See New York University Law Clinics, http://www.law.nyu.edu/clinics/year/
immigrant/index.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).  Domestic Workers United is an ad-
vocacy group, spun off from Asian advocacy organizations with substantial funding from
George Soros. See Hyde, supra note 3, at 610.  Chinese Staff Workers Association, estab-
lished in 1979, is a particularly long-lived worker representation project that advocates
for Chinese (and other) workers in all industries.  It is not affiliated with a union and is
not a union itself.  It has spun off the Lower East Side Workers Center. See Chinese
Staff and Workers’ Association, www.cswa.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).
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7. Government Bodies
The idea of worker representation through a government
agency smacks of corporatism or fascism, and would seem far from
American practice or ideology.62  However, an account of current
advocacy on behalf of low-wage immigrant service workers in New
York City, at least, would be incomplete without recognition of the
very active role of the office of the New York State Attorney Gen-
eral, as well as other governmental entities, and the way in which
their interventions shift the incentives and strategies of other
AWOs.
The current Attorney General of the State of New York, Eliot
Spitzer, has actively used his office to challenge corporate fraud
and other white-collar crimes that in the United States are often left
to be prosecuted by the federal government.63  He is an ambitious
individual expected to be his party’s candidate for Governor of New
York State in 2006.  Among his accomplishments is a bureau that is
actively litigating violations of labor standards, particularly for low-
wage, immigrant workers without other representation.64  For ex-
ample, his office brokered the agreement concerning employees of
greengrocers, which is formally an agreement between two organi-
zations of employers, the New York State AFL-CIO and Casa Mex-
ico.65  It also participated in the litigation to classify delivery
personnel for supermarkets and drug stores as employees, and to
recover back wages for them.66
The presence of such a governmental advocate is certainly an
enormous benefit to low-wage workers in New York State.  It speaks
volumes about New York’s politics that an ambitious politician
could see political advantages in advocating for undocumented
62. See generally James Q. Whitman, Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the First New Deal,
39 AM. J. CORP. L. 747 (1991).
63. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: Who is protecting the Investor?:
State-Federal Relations Post-Elliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK.  L. REV. 117, 126 (2004).
64. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Waging War, from Wall Street to Corner Grocery: Be-
yond the High-Profile Cases, Spitzer Helps Low-Wage Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at B1.
65. See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
(Aug. 30, 2000), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2000/aug/aug30a_00.html. See also
GREENGROCER CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 40.
66. Ansoumana, 255 F. Supp.2d 184.
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workers, rather than persecuting them.67  It would be better if low-
wage workers elsewhere in the United States had such vigorous gov-
ernmental advocacy.  Nevertheless, the presence of the Attorney
General alters the incentives of other advocacy organizations in
ways that I have explored elsewhere.68  Other organizations can
demonstrate their efficacy and legitimacy by teaming with the Attor-
ney General to recover economic benefits for workers.  The Attor-
ney General has incentives to produce settlements that transfer
interesting sums of money to poor people and will garner favorable
publicity.  However, he and his office have no incentive to institu-
tionalize continuing representation for the workers.  At the end of
the two campaigns mentioned, the greengrocer workers were left
with no formal representation, while the supermarket deliverers are
represented by a union that has not pursued back claims of wages
and has negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that pays just
the minimum wage.
Similarly, an advocacy campaign on behalf of domestic workers
resulted in legislation of questionable efficacy, and no advance in
representation for those workers.  The New York City Council en-
acted a local law in June 2003 requiring employment agencies to
give domestic workers referred for employment, and their employ-
ers, job descriptions and statements of the rights of employees.69
Domestic Workers United, and its allies in the NYU Clinic, gained
experience in legislative advocacy that may pay off in the future, but
67. Similarly, a successful legislative campaign by the Workplace Project to in-
crease penalties for violations of wage and hour law attracted support from Republican
state legislators, despite, or rather due to, open and vigorous advocacy by immigrants
not even documented to work.
[W]hen [Workplace Project members], as immigrants, spoke of what they
had suffered at the hands of unscrupulous employers while trying to make a
better life for their families, they challenged the senators’ conception of
these new, brown, Spanish-speaking immigrants as takers.  They sounded
surprisingly like forebears.  It was hard for the senators to separate these
immigrants, sitting before them with dignity and talking about their strug-
gle to be paid for their labor, from their own families and their experience
of building a life in the United States.
GORDON, supra note 47, at 266-67.  Most Republican legislators from the New York sub- R
urbs are children or grandchildren of immigrants. Id. at 265.
68. Hyde, supra note 3. R
69. NEW YORK, N.Y., 20 ADMIN. CODE ch. 5, § 20-770-75 (2003), available at http://
webdocs.nyccouncil.info/textfiles/Int%200096-2002.htm?CFID=1078460&CFTOKEN=
21668336.
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did not acquire any representational rights.  It is not even clear that
domestic workers are protected against discharge for affiliation with
Domestic Workers United or any other advocacy organization.70
The city council gained whatever favorable publicity resulted from
its association with the workers, but the workers gained little tangi-
ble benefit.  The biggest weakness, in my view, of AWOs is their
common inability to achieve benefits for workers without the inter-
vention of governmental agencies, which in turn lack any commit-
ment to more effective organization.
C. Inchoate Organization
8. Internet and Intranet Protest
Finally, the United States has enough experience with elec-
tronic protest by employees to permit inclusion of Internet and In-
tranet-based protest as an eighth AWO; indeed, it is the only AWO
available to most well-paid professionals.  Such protests have been
quite effective in defending existing benefits, but have not pro-
duced permanent organization and show no signs of doing so.  Em-
ployees at Apple Computer who protested on the firm’s internal e-
mail system were successful in forcing the company president to
defend, and then rescind, a change in the policy on bonuses.  How-
ever, their subsequent attempts to create a permanent organization
were ineffective.71  Similar employee protest forced changes in pen-
sion policy at IBM and Bell Atlantic.72
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING AWOS
The AWOs discussed in Part II have not yet presented any diffi-
cult legal issues.  United States labor law is generally flexible, cer-
tainly as to questions of organizational form, and this flexibility
70. Domestic workers are expressly excluded from the National Labor Relations
Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (excluding from the definition of “employee” “any indi-
vidual . . . in the domestic service of any family or person at his home”).  States are
presumably free to regulate their labor relations and protect them against retaliation,
on the model of agricultural workers. See United Farm Workers v. Ariz. Agric. Employ-
ment Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1982).
71. Libby Bishop & David I. Levine, Computer-Mediated Communication as Employee
Voice: A Case Study, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 213 (1999).
72. Virginia Munger Kahn, The Electronic Rank and File, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at
G1.
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permits AWOs to organize and act.73  In order to grasp their legal
rights and privileges, it is important to keep separate three key con-
cepts of United States labor law that are often confused:
• Employee concerted activity for mutual aid or protection,
regulated under section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act74
• Labor organization, regulated under section 2(5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act75
• Exclusive representative, regulated under section 9(a) of
the National Labor Relations Act76
All but one of the AWOs discussed in Part II represent “con-
certed activity” by employees protected by §7.77  Employees who
participate in the AWOs are thus protected against employer retali-
ation, and their organizations are entitled to whatever rights and
73. For fuller discussions, see Hyde, supra note 34; Alan Hyde et al., After Smyrna:
Rights and Powers of Unions that Represent Less than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 637
(1993).
74. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
75. NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5):
The term “labor organization” means any organization of any kind, or any
agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work.
Curiously, “union” or “labor union” are not terms of art in United States labor law.
76. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a):
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
77. The sole exception is Domestic Workers United, or other organizations of do-
mestic workers, as they are specifically excluded from the NLRA’s definition of em-
ployee, NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).  Other workers excluded from the NLRA are
agricultural laborers; individuals employed by parents or spouses; independent contrac-
tors; supervisors; and individuals subject to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §151, that
is, employees of railroads, some express companies, and airlines.  By contrast, immi-
grants not legally able to work in the United States are statutory employees for purposes
of the NLRA.  Discharge of them for union activities is illegal; however the remedial
powers of the NLRB are limited. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. v. NLRB, 535
U.S. 137 (2002) (holding the Board may not award back pay to undocumented work-
ers); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding the Board may not order
reinstatement to employees that are not permitted by law to be employed in the United
States).
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privileges the employer grants to favored groups.  Some AWOs are
statutory “labor organizations” under section 2(5), and some are
not.  This status is relevant only in determining whether they are
liable for the commission of unfair labor practices, whether an em-
ployer has improperly contributed to or supported them, or
whether they must file financial disclosure forms or observe demo-
cratic organization.  None has yet sought to be an “exclusive repre-
sentative.”  Their activities thus do not preclude other organizations
from representing and organizing workers.
A. Concerted Activity Under Section 7.
Section 7 protects certain employee activity against employer
discrimination, retaliation, interference, restraint, or coercion.78  It
does not require formal organization or inchoate organization.  For
example, it protects a group of employees who, to protest working
conditions, left an unheated machine shop that they regarded as
too cold.79  While some assertions of rights by individuals acting
alone are not protected,80 an individual’s sarcastic e-mails on a
company’s internal e-mail system, alerting other employees to the
negative consequences of proposed changes in vacation policy,
were protected against employer discipline.81
It thus appears uncontroversial that all the activity of AWOs
referred to in Part II, other than Domestic Workers United, consti-
tute protected concerted activity, including the e-mail protests at
Apple, IBM, and AT&T, and the organizations largely targeted at
undocumented immigrant workers.  Employees may not be disci-
plined for participating in them.  Moreover, employers that grant
privileges to a favored employee organization must grant equivalent
78. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).  Labor unions also may not coerce
employees in the exercise of such activity, NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1)(A), although this has not been a problem with the AWOs discussed in this
article.
79. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12 (1962) (“One of these workers,
testifying before the Board, summarized their entire discussion this way: ‘And we had
all got together and thought it would be a good idea to go home; maybe we could get
some heat brought into the plant that way.’”).
80. See Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 NLRB 882 (1986) (holding an individual com-
plaint of unsafe equipment not specifically seeking to initiate group action is not pro-
tected activity), aff’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
81. See Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 NLRB 244 (1997).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-2\NLR205.txt unknown Seq: 22 14-APR-06 7:58
406 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
privileges to other employee concerted activity, whether or not that
activity is conducted through a formal “labor organization.”82
The National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) does not
normally order an employer to meet with any organization repre-
senting some of its employees, unless and until that group repre-
sents a majority of the workforce in an appropriate unit.83  A strike
or other concerted activity by employees, however, seeking to get
the employer to deal with their non-majority organization, is clearly
protected against employer retaliation.84
B. Labor Organization Under Section 2(5)
As Saru Jayaraman correctly noted,85 there is little advantage to
an AWO in being classified as a statutory labor organization, and
some disadvantage: potential liability for unfair labor practices,86
82. NLRB v. Ne. Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1216-17 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that an
employer that grants facilities to a favored group must extend the same privileges to 9
to 5 employees, an employee group that the court held was not a statutory labor
organization).
83. Mooresville Cotton Mills, 2 N.L.R.B. 952, 955 (1937), modified and enforced, 94
F.2d 61 (4th Cir.), modified, 97 F.2d 959 (1938), modified and enforced, 110 F.2d 179
(1940); Pennypower Shopping News, 244 N.L.R.B. 536, 537 n.4 (1974).  Indeed, an
employer is also privileged to refuse to meet with a majority representative unless and
until that representative can demonstrate its majority in a Board election, Linden Lum-
ber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).  For a critique of this doctrine as
untrue to the legislative history of the NLRA, see CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE
AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2004).  At
least one case found an employer to have violated section 8(a)(1) in refusing to enter-
tain grievances from a nonmajority group, where the majority representative had col-
lapsed and the employer’s only reason for refusing to hear grievances from the
nonmajority rival was disapproval of its union affiliation.  NLRB v. Lundy Mfg. Corp.,
316 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1963).
84. See Union-Buffalo Mills Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 384 (1944); Cleveland Chair Co., 1
N.L.R.B. 892 (1936); Pennypower Shopping News, 244 N.L.R.B. 536, 537 (1974).
85. Supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
86. NLRA § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (unfair labor practices that can be commit-
ted only by a labor organization or its agents).
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reporting and disclosure obligations,87 inability to receive employer
funds,88 and obligations to observe democratic practices.89
It is very difficult to generalize about which AWOs are statutory
labor organizations.  The relevant law has been shaped in an en-
tirely different context.  Most of the cases construing that definition
apply the ban on employer support.  These cases proscribe em-
ployer support for any organization that “deals with” employers
through dialog that falls short of formal bargaining,90 while exclud-
ing some cooperative or informal management communication
devices.91
Exploration of this area of law, amply treated elsewhere, seems
unhelpful in determining the rather different policy questions of
when or whether groups like the Workplace Project, ROC-NY, or
87. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) § 201, 29 U.S.C.
§ 431 (2000).  LMRDA § 3(i), 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (1959).  The definition of labor organ-
ization for the Reporting and Disclosure Act is expressly broader than the definition
under the NLRA.  It includes, in addition to all NLRA labor organizations, “any confer-
ence, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council” intermediate in union
structure, even when those bodies do not deal with employers and thus are not labor
organizations for purposes of the NLRA.
88. NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (making it an unfair labor practice for
an employer “to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it.”  Some of the AWOs
discussed in Part I do receive such employer financial support, including identity
caucuses and the Immigrants Support Network).
89. LMRDA §§ 101-105, 401-504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415, 481-504.  Some of the
AWOs discussed in Part II do not observe democratic or participatory forms at all, such
as Working America and Working Today.  It is not clear how democratic WashTech and
Alliance@IBM are.  Other AWOs, while probably generally democratic, might well find
it onerous to comply with such specific requirements of the LMRDA as secret ballots
every three years. See LMRDA § 401(b), 29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (local labor organizations);
formal procedures for removal of officers, § 401(h), 29 U.S.C. § 481(h); or continuing
obligations to inform members of their rights under the LMRDA, § 105, 29 U.S.C.
§ 415. See also Thomas v. Grand Lodge of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Work-
ers, 201 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2000) (construing union’s obligations under the LMRDA
section requiring labor organizations to inform members concerning the provisions of
the LMRDA).
90. See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1958) (explaining “dealing with”
employer is broader than bargaining and includes making suggestions); Electromation,
Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that Ac-
tion Committees alert management to areas of employee discontent and “deal with”
employer).
91. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 899 (1993) (holding
that conferences and meetings that solicit employee suggestions are not labor organiza-
tions).  The line is elusive; the law review literature enormous.
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Immigrants Support Network should have to disclose their finances
or be liable for unfair labor practices.  In the cases involving em-
ployer support, the employer has a privilege to communicate with
employees.  The existence of this privilege might be a reason to
construe “labor organization” narrowly.  By contrast, it is difficult to
identify any privilege in employee organizations to operate free of
disclosure rules or unfair labor practice liability, merely because
they understandably find it convenient to do so.
Some of the AWOs are almost certainly not statutory labor or-
ganizations, because they never “deal with” employers.  Examples
are Working America, the AFL-CIO membership affiliate; Immi-
grants Support Network, the lobbying group; and Working Today,
the benefits provider.  WashTech and Alliance@IBM similarly do
not yet appear to deal with Microsoft or IBM respectively.  The In-
ternet protests are also probably not statutory labor organizations,
because they are probably not organizations at all.
Identity caucuses, like African-American or gay and lesbian
caucuses, present a more difficult legal issue.  These groups do in-
teract with an employer, in the sense of making suggestions about
recruiting or taking on recruiting tasks.  They rarely make formal
demands.  They normally do receive some financial support from
employers, which would be illegal for a labor organization.  While
no precedent speaks to the issue, the Board, as mentioned, main-
tains that purely communicative bodies are not statutory labor orga-
nizations.  Identity caucuses might exemplify this category better
than employee meetings.
In my opinion, worker centers like the Workplace Project, and
worker groups like ROC-NY, are quite likely to be statutory labor
organizations.  They do indeed raise grievances with particular em-
ployers on behalf of particular employees.  Even if this is not collec-
tive bargaining, it is similar to activity that has been held to
constitute the activity of dealing with employers.  Moreover, it is
hard to come up with any compelling policy reason why such
groups should be exempt from disclosure requirements, or restric-
tions such as the thirty-day limit on organizational picketing that
bind more traditional unions.
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The Board has held, although not recently, that some labor-
community alliances92 or labor advocacy groups93 are not statutory
labor organizations.  Since these groups normally do “deal with”
employers over individual employee grievances, the logic of these
Board decisions is not obvious, and is likely to come under pressure
over the next few years.94
C. Exclusive Representation Under Section 9(a)
A labor organization that represents a majority of the
workforce in an appropriate unit becomes the exclusive representa-
tive of the workforce.95  The employer may treat with no other or-
ganization and commits an unfair labor practice in doing so, or in
dealing directly with employees.96  Such exclusive representation al-
lows an organization the unique privilege to negotiate an agree-
ment requiring all employees to pay union dues.97  However, it also
owes all employees in the unit a duty of fair representation as to
negotiation or grievance handling.98  There are few other privileges
attached to majority status.99  In particular, non-majority employee
organizations may normally seek and obtain voluntary recognition
for their members, present demands, conclude binding agree-
ments, and conduct strikes and boycotts.100  It is thus unlikely that
92. Center for United Labor Action, 219 N.L.R.B. 873, 873 (1975).
93. Ne. Univ., 601 F.2d at 1216 n.9 (finding that 9 to 5 organization was not a
labor organization).
94. For discussions and critiques of this area of NLRB law, see Marion Crain and
Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1789-91 (2001);  James Gray
Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and
the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 944-45 (1991).
95. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
96. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944) (citing NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44 (1937)).
97. See NLRA § 8(a)(3)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(i).
98. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n. v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991); Steele v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
99. A certified majority union is privileged to use secondary boycotts to force the
employer to recognize it.  NLRA § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B).  A majority
union may insulate itself from challenge by signing a collective bargaining agreement; a
non-majority union might face an NLRB election at any time. See MICHAEL C. HARPER,
SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOAN FLYNN, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 428-30
(5th Ed. 2003).
100. Hyde et al., After Smyrna, supra note 73, at 638. R
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any of the AWOs will be tempted to seek to become an exclusive
representative in the foreseeable future.
IV. THEORETICAL ISSUES RAISED BY ALTERNATIVE
WORKER ORGANIZATIONS
While it is far too soon to reach very definite conclusions about
AWOs, it is not too soon to begin to raise questions about their
likely stability, achievements, and challenges to traditional labor
law.  The theoretical questions that follow are attempts to frame,
and begin to answer, questions for activists, policy makers, and
scholars.  Are AWOs doomed to be such weak substitutes for tradi-
tional unions that the law should discourage them?  Are AWOs so
superior to unions that the law should specifically encourage them
over unions?  I think the answers to both those questions are “no.”
The following briefly identifies areas for further research that
would help answer these policy questions.
A. Do AWOs Face Collective Action Problems Distinct from Those
Faced by Traditional Unions?
Some of the early theoretical analysis of AWOs addressed their
difficulty in mobilizing collective action, since rational workers
would presumably choose to be free riders rather than make margi-
nal contributions to collective action.101  This focus seems mis-
taken.  While AWOs do face collective action problems, they are in
no way different from the collective action problems faced by labor
unions.  While it is difficult for unions to overcome those collective
action problems, their techniques for doing so are largely available
to AWOs.
Unions cannot overcome collective action problems by appeals
to economic rationality.102  They must persuade potential members
and activists to redefine their interests.  This has been described as
the “two logics of collective action.”103  In order to motivate mem-
101. See, e.g., EMERGING, supra note 5; David Weil, Individual Rights and Collective
Agents: The Role of Old and New Workplace Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets, in
EMERGING, supra note 5, at 13.
102. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 88 (1971).
103. CLAUS OFFE, DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM: CONTEMPORARY TRANSFORMATIONS OF
WORK AND POLITICS 170 (Claus Offe & John Keane eds., 1985).
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bers, induce action, foster legislative change, or exist at all, any em-
ployee organization, including unions, must make emotional,
affective appeals to motivate collective action.  Such ideal or vision-
ary appeals can construct collective identity and motivate action,
where appeals to economic interest either actually failed, or would
have failed.104
Because AWOs are often organized as movements that organ-
ize workers through identities broader than “employee,” they may
have certain advantages over unions in motivating the affective,
ideal, “second” logic of collective action, and not just over issues of
race or immigration.  The three crucial factors in explaining partic-
ipation in movements for social change are perceived injustice, per-
ceived efficacy of group action, and an identity around which the
group can form.105  Unions in the United States have increasing
difficulty in appealing to an identity, as such identities as “working
class” or “union” lose appeal or even meaning.106  By contrast,
many of the successful AWOs grow out of, and further construct,
such vital identities as “immigrant” or “domestic worker” and so on.
Obviously we are very far from a convincing social theory of the
comparative roles of economic incentive and affective identity in
constructing group action, or a theory of worker action comparing
these factors.  Many case studies await.  In the current state of
knowledge, however, there is no reason to assume unique collective
action problems for AWOs.107
104. Theoretical treatments include JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY
OF SOCIAL ORDER (1989); CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE IN-
VOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION 15-33 (1996); CLAUS OFFE, supra note 103; R
Alan Hyde, A Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 383 (1990).  Case studies that
attempt carefully to untangle economic from ideal appeals as motivators of action in-
clude RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY: CONSCIOUSNESS, ACTION, AND CONTEMPO-
RARY AMERICAN WORKERS (1988); PETER SWENSON, FAIR SHARES: UNIONS, PAY, AND
POLITICS IN SWEDEN AND WEST GERMANY (1989); Bert Klandermans, Mobilization and Par-
ticipation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory, 49 AM. SOC. REV.
583 (1984); Staughton Lynd, The Genesis of the Idea of a Community Right to Industrial
Property in Youngstown and Pittsburgh, 1977-87, 74 J. AM. HIST. 926 (1987); James Gray
Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 990-92 (1997).
105. Bert Klandermans, How Group Identification Helps to Overcome the Dilemma of Col-
lective Action, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 887, 888 (2002).
106. See generally Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Indi-
vidualism as a Cause for Labor’s Decline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133 (1988).
107. Charles Heckscher once saw the future of labor organization as importantly
linked to the model of, and alliance with, identity groups such as African American,
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B. Do AWOs Have Unique Difficulties in Projecting Power and
Attaining Results?
AWOs, like any other organization, have mixed records of suc-
cess.  Yet some of the successes are remarkable, particularly those
female, gay and lesbian, or Hispanic. HECKSCHER, supra note 104, at 68, 211, 274 n.1.
He is now more skeptical.  He notes that such groups are not “essentially focused on the
world of work.”  For them, “the workplace is just one venue for asserting universal rights.
Thus they have not focused clearly on defining the kind of workplace that would meet
their ideal of justice.”  “Even more important, however, is the fact that identity move-
ments have generally failed to sustain strong organizations; they have a significant ten-
dency to fracture.”  In contrast to older communities or even class identities:
The new identity movements, by contrast, are based around the deliberate
“bringing to consciousness” of a sense of community that had been hidden,
and a development of solidarity through ongoing participatory dialogue
and self-criticism; they are thus in an important sense intentionally unsettled.
Joshua Gamson has therefore raised the provocative question, “Must iden-
tity movements self-destruct?”: “Sexuality-based politics. . . contains a more
general predicament of identity politics, whose workings and implications
are not well understood: it is as liberating and sensible to demolish a collec-
tive identity as it is to establish one.”
Charles Heckscher, Organizations, Movements, and Networks, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 326
(2005-2006) (quoting Joshua Gamson, Must identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Di-
lemma, 42 SOC. PROB. 390, 402 (1995)).
Heckscher’s concerns are worthy of serious thought, but if one believes at all in the
future of worker organization, one must regard identity politics as a force to be used,
not as a threat: essentially all successful new union organizing in the United States in the
past two decades has involved workers linked by, and organizing around, a shared eth-
nic or other group identity.  I am thinking specifically of three of the numerically larg-
est organizational victories of the 1990s: the organization of dry-wall workers, nearly all
Mexican, in Los Angeles County, the largest such victory, see Ruth Milkman & Kent
Wong, Organizing the Wicked City: The 1992 Southern California Drywall Strike, in ORGANIZ-
ING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 169-98
(Ruth Milkman ed., 2000); the Justice for Janitors Campaign of the Service Employees
International Union, Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles and
Beyond: A New Form of Unionism in the 21st Century?, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS:
NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION (Phanindra W. Wunnava ed., 2004); Jesu´s Martinez Sal-
dan˜a, At the Periphery of Democracy: The Binational Politics of Mexican Immigrants in
Silicon Valley (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berke-
ley) (union using Mexican ethnic appeals); and the same union’s extraordinary cam-
paign to organize home health care attendants in Los Angeles County, Karl Klare, The
Horizons of Transformative Labour and Employment Law, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 20-23 (Joanne Conaghan
et al. eds., 2002).
As Heckscher’s quote from Gamson suggests, there may be a future for a group
organized around the successive construction and smashing of identities.  United States
history suggests that this might be the fate of AWOs that currently organize immigrants
and will live to see that identity smashed.
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that would not have been predicted by existing economic models of
group action.
How could the members of the Workplace Project, unable to
speak English, vote, or legally work in the United States, persuade
the New York Legislature to increase employer penalties for wage
violations?108  Why did Apple, IBM, and AT&T executives respond,
then give in to, on-line employee protests when they were under no
legal obligation to do so and employees threatened no economic
harm?109  The Apple case is particularly poignant.110  Employees,
acting spontaneously on the company e-mail system, had a protest
technique for forcing the company CEO to respond to their de-
mands and ultimately give in, neither a privilege that attaches to
unions.  Yet they abandoned this effective AWO in search of perma-
nent organization, which ultimately failed.  “While these Apple em-
ployees were in no sense poor people, they would seem to represent
another illustration of the thesis of [Frances F.] Piven and [Richard
A.] Cloward (1977) that popular protest or insurgency often be-
comes ineffectual once organizers transform it into mass perma-
nent organization.”111
Again, we are far from a social theory of power in employee
groups with limited organization.  The issues concerning late-career
employees in firms with internal labor markets (such as IBM or
AT&T) need to be kept strictly separate from those concerning
workers in high-velocity labor markets who can expect only short
job tenures.  The senior employees may successfully invoke the em-
ployer’s concern with morale that plays such a major role in empiri-
cal, as opposed to theoretical, labor economics.112  By contrast,
contingent employees are defined as such precisely because the em-
ployer achieves no gains from longevity.  Thus no such rents are
available for potential redistribution to employees.  For them, dis-
ruption of the employers through demonstrations — like those
conducted by ROC-NY or informal organizations of West African
delivery personnel or Mexican greengrocer assistants — is probably
108. GORDON, supra note 47. R
109. Bishop & Levine, supra note 71; Kahn, supra note 72, at G1. R
110. Bishop & Levine, supra note 71. R
111. HYDE, supra note 4, at 161 (citing FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, R
POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL (1977)).
112. See TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION (1999).
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the necessary first act to brokering a more permanent settlement;
the second step needs to include institutional help.113  Again, how-
ever, AWOs are on balance probably superior to unions in their
ability to carry out such disruption.
C. Will the Alliances Necessary to the Growth of AWOs Impede
their Effectiveness for Employees?
I have argued elsewhere that making the alliances necessary for
the growth of AWOs is the real problem that will be faced by the
AWOs.114  To establish themselves among both donors and poten-
tial members they must achieve victories.  Law can be seductive.
Lawyers, law students, and especially government lawyers, can re-
cover back wages or other legal victories.  This is certainly a good
thing if you are the worker who has been underpaid.  Yet pressure
by these actors for a quick financial settlement may result in weak
organization for the workers, as in the case of the Greengrocer
Agreement or the settlement of the delivery personnel litigation.
The problem of using law to build an organization is not a new
one, and has been approached many ways in the history of legal
services organization.  Much of Jennifer Gordon’s inspiring account
of the Workplace Project is taken up with ever-changing attempts to
use legal representation to build the organization.115  The relation-
ship between law and building an AWO is particularly delicate,
since it is far from clear what kinds of organizations need to be
built.  It seems premature to criticize law for assisting the “wrong
kind” of organization, so long as it is not undermining organization
altogether.
113. When the employer wants to retain protestors, like employees at Apple, IBM,
or AT&T, employees may not need permanent organization.  Employees may be best
off with the technical means (e-mail or intranet) to stage periodic protests until their
demands are met.  When the employees are marginal and the employer has no interest
in their longevity (greengrocer helpers, delivery personnel, and restaurant workers),
demonstrations are never enough by themselves.  Demonstrations are the first step at
building a movement, but then allies are necessary to achieve gains.  And for those
workers, the gains should include some protection for their organization, since they
cannot live on protests alone.  Protection for their organization is precisely what was
lacking in the greengrocer and delivery settlements, and where ROC-NY is achieving
better results.
114. See Hyde, supra note 3. R
115. See GORDON, supra note 47. R
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IV. CONCLUSION
While unions shrink, AWOs grow very slowly.  It is far too soon
to say whether any or all of these might enroll really large numbers
of workers, or find a way of reaching a substantial group of workers
who fall outside traditional unions.  However, early indications are
that movement-style organizing may help build worker organiza-
tions by overcoming collective action problems and projecting
workers’ voices.  Fortunately, United States labor law is flexible on
matters of organizational form.  With the rise of AWOs, this flexibil-
ity will face major challenges over the next decade.
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